ABSTRACT
A common strategy for articulating the cognitive norms at work in pragmatism is to contrast William James's doctrine of the will to believe with W. K. Clifford's evidentialism. This chapter outlines the core of Cliffordian pragmatism about belief. It explains why Clifford adopts his famously demanding version of the evidentialist's norm. With Cliffordian pragmatism in place, the chapter presents three arguments against James's will-to-believe doctrine. The first extends Clifford's argument that credulous belief endangers others. The second contends that James's practical cases of willing-to-believe are all morally abhorrent. The third demonstrates that James's religious application of the will-to-believe doctrine yields intellectually insular faith communities and invites what one call the problem of deepening dogmatism. The result is not only that Clifford was a pragmatist, but he was the better pragmatist. James's ascending case draws an analogy between the doxastic efficacy of friend-making, romantic conquest, and social advancement, and the doxastic efficacy of religious belief.
