ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses some difficulties that stand in the way of reaching an answer that will be agreeable across the theist/atheist divide to a particular pro-theism/anti-theism question, the question on ‘the’ comparative pro-theism/anti-theism. The comparative pro-theism/anti-theism question is difficult to state in a way that will be acceptable to both theist and atheist alike, as it is about the difference in value between the actual world and the nearest world. Kraay and Dragos define pro-theism as the view that it would be far better if God exists than if he does not; anti-theism, as the view that it would be far worse if God exists than if he does not; and they distinguish various sub-views within each. In Mawson, the chapter argues that the only way to ground judgements that it would be better or worse were situations which obtain of metaphysical necessity to have been different is to portray metaphysically possible worlds as a subset of logically possible worlds.
