ABSTRACT
Various philosophers and theologians, including Aquinas, Leibniz, Bernard Lonergan, and Hugo Meynell, see evidence for the existence of God in the fact that the universe is intelligible to us. This chapter makes clear what “intelligibility” means in this context and in particular, what it had better not mean. It examines and rejects some reasons philosophers have given for thinking that the intelligibility of the universe requires or suggests supernatural and more particularly, theistic backing. The chapter argues that supernaturalism, including theism, would in fact threaten the complete intelligibility of the universe. It argues that supernaturalism, including theism, would impose non-epistemic costs as well. Admittedly, intuitionistic logicians do claim to accept all of the laws of classical logic except for excluded middle and double-negation elimination. The chapter also argues that supernaturalism, including theism, is worse than unnecessary for human knowledge: it positively threatens human knowledge. It concludes by describing some more broadly axiological threats posed by supernaturalism, including theism.
