ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author elaborates further the first element of his moderately heteronomous view, namely passive self-identification. He gives an interpretation of Harry Frankfurt's theory of the will with respect to the complementary issues of autonomy and necessity. In constructing a theory of the will Frankfurt initially favours the Hobbes-Hume tradition as against the Kantian one. Although Frankfurt endorses naturalism, he is surely not a proponent of the causal theory of action, according to which beliefs and desires causally explain and constitute intentional action. Once the conception of the hierarchical appetitive will and the attendant notion of self-identification are in place, Frankfurt explains the constitution of the autonomy of the will by invoking the process of self-identification and the state of volitional harmony. To be sure, the doctrine of volitional foundationalism goes against the grain of dominant contemporary analytical thinking about the nature of the will and the constitution of personal autonomy.
