ABSTRACT
This chapter explores some possibilities for engaging phenomenologically with issues of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. As a method, phenomenology begins with first person experience, but it does not end there; rather, the aim of the phenomenological method is to identify the fundamental structures of experience and signficance presupposed by perception, thought, and language. In reducing phenomenology to subjective feeling, Fricker excludes the resources of a method that begins with a reflection on the lived experience of first person consciousness, but also extends beyond subjective feeling to trace the intersubjective constitution of a sense of the objective world. For Fricker, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice call for the active cultivation of epistemic habits and practices that correct for prejudice by neutralizing its impact on one's perception and judgment, and by "compensating upwards to reach the degree of credibility that would have been given were it not for the prejudice".
