ABSTRACT
Hermeneutical injustice is the phenomenon that occurs when the intelligibility of communicators is unfairly constrained or undermined, when their meaning-making capacities encounter unfair obstacles, or when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair advantage when it comes to making sense of their social experience. This chapter elucidates different versions and dimensions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice and how it relates to issues of epistemic responsibility. It suggests that there are forms of hermeneutical injustices that are so damaging that they can result in hermeneutical death, that is, in phenomena that radically constrain one's hermeneutical capacities and agency such as the following: the loss of one's voice, of one's interpretative capacities, or of one's status as a participant in meaning-making and meaning-sharing practices. The chapter addresses different possible classifications of hermeneutical injustices and how these classifications offer conceptual resources for diagnosing cases of hermeneutical injustices and for identifying ways of resisting hermeneutical marginalization.
