ABSTRACT
There are many successive selves in the case of a single human being, according to the Transience view, and this rings a loud Humean bell: the selves of the Transience view sound like the sorts of things that get bundled together by Bundle views to make a single self that has some kind of long-term existence. A perception is not just a content or content-type, an impression-content-type or an idea-content-type, on his view. A perception is a perceiving, an experience is an experiencing: an actual occurrence, an occurrent conscious 'tokening' of a particular type of impression or idea. To say that perceptions or experiences may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separately, is in no way to say that they can exist without a subject. So if experiences do exist separately in the way imagined, all that follows is that there are as many subjects of experience as there are experiences – a version of the Transience view.
