ABSTRACT
This chapter begins by recommending more precise formulations of cognitivist and non-cognitivist hypotheses. Also worth noting, the hypotheses do not make cognitivism and non-cognitivism logical contradictories. The contradictory of cognitivism would be the negative component of non-cognitivism. The clearest example of a cognitivist metaethic, and the target of most non-cognitivist arguments, is some form of realism. One common theme has been that cognitivists explain the nature of normative judgments by saying that they are representational beliefs while non-cognitivists say they are non-representational, desire-like states. Disagreement and error might be the deepest concerns for non-cognitivism. The single most important consideration weighing in favor of non-cognitivism—and particularly in favor of psychological non-cognitivism—is the motivational profile of certain normative judgments. Now, if the first option, known as strong motivational internalism, captures the motivational data, psychological non-cognitivists are in a good position to explain it.
