ABSTRACT
Lewis's ambitious constitutivism about value would then follow from functionalism about psychology. For those who are wary of talk of explanation, constitutivism can be restated in terms of an entailment claim and a claim about the relative fundamentality of features. Perhaps surprisingly, Scanlon's theory of reasons for action is also well understood as a version of constitutivism that explains facts about reasons for action in terms of the goodness-fixing kind deliberator. Imagine people who are motivated to act in the way that some guru instructs people to act, and imagine that what the guru instructs people to do is completely different from what they would be motivated to do if they deliberated well. According to all of these versions of constitutivism, these people act in ways they have no reasons to act. They are deliberators, so what they have reason to do is fixed by what they would be motivated to do if they deliberated well.
