ABSTRACT

The substantial improvement in socio-economic conditions in Indonesia has been followed by an increase in women’s independence and empowerment as well as the divorce rate. This study aims at examining the relationship between women’s bargaining power and marital stability. According to Nash Equilibrium derived from mixed strategy, the relationship between women’s bargaining power and marital stability could be both positive and negative depending on the level of women’s bargaining power. We conducted an online survey among 752 married women to find out who acted as decision maker on their household expenditure, which indicated women’s bargaining power, and to identify occurrence of households conflict which indicated stability. By controlling such variables as education, income, ethnicity, religion and divorce experience, our econometric estimations confirm the U-shaped relationship between women’s bargaining power and stability. As the women’s bargaining power increases, household conflict decreases until it reaches some level beyond which the conflict starts to increase. Marital instability tends to be higher when the wives have experienced divorce, are in mixed unions, and were married because of other possible reasons (marriage by accident). This study suggests that a smaller socio-economic gap between couples will guarantee less household conflict and more stability in marriages.