ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that contingency does not lead to vicious arbitrariness. It discusses why contingency is not as worrisome as some suppose. The chapter sketches a form of Humean constructivism that is substantive in the sense that it holds that certain reasons that apply to all social beings are extractable from the practical point of view of such beings-specifically, that feature of the practical point of view involved in evaluating. The more substantive forms of constructivism were not adequately discussed in On What Matters. Like the Kantian constructivist, the substantive Humean constructivist will seek to extract a commitment to substantive norms-certain reasons for action that obtain for particular agents-from a particular standpoint, that of the evaluator. Some constructivists accept versions of reasons internalism because norms are 'constructed' and reasons derived from an agent's own practical point of view. Some argue that reasons internalism has serious advantages over reasons externalism.
