ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the non-proliferation policy of the United States was implemented through coercive diplomacy. On the basis of dominant military strength and economic power, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations attempted to dismantle the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea by every conceivable means, utilising hard power, soft power and smart power. Arguing that the use of coercive diplomacy has ostensibly been a rational choice for a country which became the hyper-power and how US coercive diplomacy was challenged by the counter-coercive diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the chapter examines the efficacy of US coercive diplomacy on Iran and North Korea by applying the prospect theory for the better understanding of both countries as unitary and rational agents of foreign policy. To understand coercive diplomacy, it is critical to distinguish between the two sub-concepts of coercion; compellence and deterrence.
