ABSTRACT
Prompt adaptation of the judicial system to the extraordinary conditions of an insurgency, an agonizing problem at best, is a necessity. The importance of a cause, an absolute essential at the outset of an insurgency, decreases progressively as the insurgent acquires strength. The strategy of conventional warfare prescribes the conquest of the enemy's territory, the destruction of his forces. Once the insurgent has established his hold over the population, the minority that was hostile to him becomes invisible. That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. There seems to be room for merits and defects in counterinsurgency warfare. It seems natural that the counterinsurgent's forces should be organized into two types of units. It follows that when a mobile unit is sent to operate temporarily in an area, it must come under the territorial command, even if the military commander of the area is the junior officer.
