ABSTRACT

The first general task in a systematic defence of moral luck is to argue against views of moral responsibility that categorically deny the existence of moral luck. This chapter deals with Levy's skeptical argument from luck in which he argues that luck undermines responsibility-level control with respect to a particular family of compatibilist views, because his argument is the most recent and sophisticated skeptical argument from luck in the literature. It attempts to clarify the claims in the Luck Pincer by explicating Levy's account of present and constitutive luck, and situates Levy's accounts of luck with the concept of luck. The chapter argues that the Universal Luck Premise is false by marshaling several counterexamples against it. It expresses the Luck Pincer with a weaker luck scope premise that plausibly survives those counterexamples. The chapter also argues that even the Revised Luck Pincer is unsound, because the Responsibility Negation Premise is false. Luck does not always undermine responsibility-level control.