ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses two points Linda Zagzebski makes: one in criticism of the author and one she makes by the way. The point she makes by the way is one the author agree with and constitutes the basis of another objection to Hick’s efforts to support his soulmaking theodicy. Hick acknowledges that it appears reasonable to believe that there are evils an omnipotent being could have prevented without loss of soul-making. It is rational to believe that evils that appear not to serve soul-making occur in far greater excess than what is required for it to be rational for us to believe that there are excess evils. Zagzebski argues that the author cannot discredit thesis 1 by using the point that it is rational to believe that evils not needed for soul-making occur far in excess of what is required for it to be rational for us to believe that there are excess evils.
