ABSTRACT
In his essay “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil” Michael Bergmann argues that the author's 1996 effort to strengthen the evidential argument from evil fails because it presupposes the falsity of one or more plausible skeptical theses. Bergmann suggests that skeptical thesis (ST1) is reasonable, or at least not unreasonable, owing to our “awareness of our cognitive limitations and the vastness and complexity of reality.” This chapter, after a preliminary comment, presents the author's response to Bergmann’s discussion of the author's 1996 argument from evil. Bergmann claims that the only way the author has of justifying the claim that it is likely, or at least not unlikely, that the God justifying goods for E1 and E2 will be goods known to us is by assuming as a premise the denial of ST1. The chapter discusses Bergmann’s justification for this particular point.
