ABSTRACT
Kierkegaard’s references to the concept of ambiguity (Tvetydighed ), a term also translated as “equivocalness,” are present both in his pseudonymous writings (Either/Or, The Concept of Anxiety, and Stages on Life’s Way) and in his signed ones (including his journals and published works such as The Concept of Irony and The Moment). The use of the adjective “ambiguous” (tvetydig) is also common in these texts, but like the noun it is not systematically applied, appearing rather randomly and with different purposes. There arises, therefore, a question about whether ambiguity can be understood as a central concept in Kierkegaard’s thought, as is the case with concepts such as irony and anxiety. This question is hard to answer, though it seems reasonable to consider the concept of ambiguity as one among many characteristic Kierkegaardian contra-concepts: just like ironic equivocation or ineffable anxiety, ambiguity is characterized by its indeterminacy of meaning. It communicates a difficulty related to the final, complete elucidation of the issue concerned.
