ABSTRACT
This chapter shows how the concessive classicist–one who would try to find a place for vagueness within the classical landscape–is forced to misunderstand vagueness. It describes a non-classical way of looking at concepts and classification, a way upon which vagueness is the norm, and sharpness an artefact. The chapter focuses on the notion of higher-order vagueness. It shows that this notion is essentially a manifestation of the grip which the classical conception has upon philosophers, a grip which the author trying to loosen. The chapter notices three things about Wright's proof. First, one cannot feel happy with the introduction of the undefined 'Def'. Second, it remains to be shown that Wright's characteristic sentence is just the right one. Third, it remains to be shown that some characteristic-sentence approach to the question what is vagueness, or what is higher-order vagueness, is correct. The chapter shows the importance of the project-proper exploration of the notion.
