ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author shows that the prima facie case for symmetry between the higher and lower orders survives Crispin Wright’s argument to the contrary. In Wright presents an argument with the conclusion that it is higher-order vagueness, which is paradoxical. A simple manoeuvre removes the threat of paradox to the latter, he claims, and while at first sight this manoeuvre succeeds equally with higher-order vagueness, at second sight it does not. Turn to higher-order vagueness. It is an essential feature of vague concepts that borderline cases may be closer or further from clear cases. This feature generates the Sorites, and the pressure to speak of higher-order vagueness. It is what distinguishes vagueness from other reasons to postulate truth-value gaps–not every term with a positive and a negative extension and a remainder is vague. As Mark Sainsbury says, paradigms and ‘anti-paradigms’ loom large in philosopher's grasp of vague concepts.
