ABSTRACT
Philosophers. psychologists. and various others who inquire into the nature of mind and body have long recognized that a person with a recently paraly7ed or amputated limb may claim that he can still try to move that limb. These cases are unusual because the person claims to be trying to do something quite impossible for him. By defmition. a paralytic cannot move the affected limb. The importance of these unusual cases of trying lies in the fact that they promise to reveal the essence of human action. Because these acts of trying fail to achieve even the most minimal of effects intended by the agent. they appear to isolate what is essential to all human bodily actions. The only difference. it seems. between cases of ordinary overt bodily actions and these cases of paralytics' trying is that the agent's activity in the one instance is successful in producing the intended effects. whereas in the other it is unsuccessful. In these special cases. the referent of the description 'his trying to move his limb' is apparently an event essentially involved in all human action, an event some philosophers have called a 'volition' or 'willing.' What these cases seem to allow is a defense of something like traditional volitionism based upon claims about trying. This move - from trying to willing - is what I want to reject. Although I do not deny that these unusual cases of trying are significant for anyone concerned with human action, I do not believe that their significance is based upon their success in revealing any essential elements involved in human actions. such as volitions or willings.
