ABSTRACT
How can an emphasis on the concept of trying alone revive a volitionist picture of action? When a candidate attempts to become president, the attempt is simply made up of the candidate's various actions during the campaign. When a base runner tries to steal second base, the trying consists in merely those bodily movements which constitute running to second base in the appropriate circumstances. When someone tries to move a piano across a room, the trying just is one's pushing against the object. Surely these instances of trying do nothing to illuminate the nature of action? One must already have some notion of action in these cases to explicate the trying. All of these cases are, however, what the volitionist would describe as 'instrumental' action or 'instrumental' trying. In all these examples, one is said to have tried only because one successfully performed an intentional action or series of intentional actions which constitute the attempt. Focusing exclusively on these cases may be misleading. If one directs one's attention to attempts to perform 'basic' acts then one may begin to uncover something essential to all physical actions. For instance, consider trying to move one's arm when the arm does not cooperate, does not move. One cannot in such cases claim that the trying consisted in certain physical movements. No physical movements occurred, yet something did happen. This something - trying - is what volitionists claim is of the essence of physical action.
