ABSTRACT

Critics of utilitarianism frequently call attention to the abhorrent policies that unrestricted aggregative reasoning might justify under certain possible, or even actual, circumstances. Objections to utilitarianism have often focused on its demanding and intrusive character, and other theories of right may grant individuals both greater discretion and better protection. Classical utilitarianism, of course, counts equality as a means, namely as a means to maximum aggregate utility. Economists often speak of 'trade-offs' between equality and other concerns. Equality in the distribution of particular classes of goods is at least sometimes of value as a means to the attainment of other valued ends, and in other cases fairness and equality are valuable in their own right. Beyond these and other instrumental arguments, fairness and equality often figure in moral argument as independently valuable states of affairs. One common view of the place of rights, and moral rules generally, within utilitarianism holds that they are useful as means to the coordination of action.