ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the distinguish between egalitarian of different strengths and indicates that certain counterexamples to stronger sorts of theses fail to disturb correlative weaker ones. It discusses two Rawlsian criticisms of equality of welfare. The first says that an uncorrected welfare metric wrongly equates pleasures and preferences which differ in moral character. The second criticism says that the welfare metric caters unjustifiably to expensive tastes which are generated by, for example, their bearer's lack of self-discipline. The chapter shows that much of Ronald Dworkin's critique of equality of welfare will be met if egalitarians allow deviations from equality of welfare which reflect people's choices: that is, Arneson's equal opportunity for welfare theory. It suggests that Amartya Sen's writings on "capability" introduce two answers to his "Equality of What?" question, each of which has its attractions but which differ substantially in content, as it shall shows at length elsewhere.
