ABSTRACT
Alexius Meinong uses 'object' as a general term. Note that 'object'—as a general term—is not a 'category' of ontology, in the same sense in which 'being' or 'one' are not categories of Aristotelian ontology. Confirming the profoundly empirical character of Meinong's philosophical inquiry, is that his theory of objects is not the result of abstract postulations. Generally speaking, Meinong's theory of objects sprang from his development of the theories of intentional reference and evidence of Franz Brentano, whose pupil Meinong had been. The problem of modes of being is an area of Meinong's theory fraught with linguistic pitfalls. In fact, Meinong uses 'object' in two different senses. The being of an object concerns the frequently-mentioned oppositions between the existence and non-existence of real objects and between the subsistence and non-subsistence of ideal ones. The subsequent opposition among explicit, implicit and fictitious objects is one of the Ernst Mally's main contributions. In Mally's theory, 'explicit' mainly means 'grasped by judgement.'.
