ABSTRACT
Alexius Meinong's doctrine of the Außersein of the pure object posits a semantic domain of absolute ontic neutrality. Außersein is literally beyond being, a realm of object theory objects that comprehends not an ontology, but an extraontology. The concept of Außersein occurs relatively late in Meinong's philosophy. Ironically, despite Meinong's emphasis on the Außersein of the pure object, he has frequently been misunderstood as supposing that all objects must have some sort of being in order to be referents or predicants. As a way of testing Meinong's theory of Außersein, it is worthwhile to examine its strengths and weaknesses in light of extensionalist criticisms of beingless objects. In replacing the concept of Quasisein with that of Außersein, Meinong had grasped the inadequacies of Quasisein. The difference between Außersein and Quasisein is not limited only to the fact that Außersein is not a watered-down type of Sein minimally required for reference and true predication.
