ABSTRACT

Katzenstein does not look at in detail how the smallness of the administrations of smaller states may affect their interactions internationally. He examines the relationship between administrations, the political elite and interest groups in smaller states but he does not directly tackle the advantages or disadvantages of a small administration. He discusses in general terms the organization in smaller states: organization meaning both the state bureaucracy and private institutions. He argues that organizations in smaller states, private or public, have a broader function as they deal with a greater variety of issues than organizations in larger states. Organizations in smaller states are less spe•;::ialized: they work more closely than those of larger states with other na1~ional organizations in order to solve problems. Institutions in small states are selective in problem definition, as our evidence suggested in the previous chapter, and they make interorganizational relations very personal. Katzenstein argues that there is.a fluidity of relationships in smaller states, together with oligarchic tendencies within them as decisions are made by few decision-makers. Centralization of domestic structures in smaller states is a result of their small size and dependence on world mark·ets. This in turn impacts on the policy-process in the smaller states which differs from that of larger states. 184

We have to establish whether these characteristics do exist within the administrations of the smaller EU states, and if so, to what extent they impact upon the behaviour of the smaller s1tates in the EU. We ne€:d also to go further than Katzenstein and look more directly and in more detail at the characteristics of the administration of smaller states. Katzenstein does briefly mention the relationship of the administration of the smaller states with domestic economic policy-making. He argues that smaller states are statist, for two reasons. Firstly, they accord their administration an important place in policy-making. Secondly, they are highly selective in pre-empting the costs of change through intervention, and they undertake protection in the name of structural transformation.185 On the other hand, Katzenstein argues that smaller states are also antistatist because they neutralize their administrations by a lack of autonomy and their own political interests. 186 However, he does not explain clearly how he comes to these findings and what implications this has for the international behaviour of smaller states. We need, therefore, to examine the characteristics of smaller administrations and see how they compare with those of larger states if we want to establish their behaviour in the decision-making process of the EU.