ABSTRACT
Justice requires that those who need organs in order to lead a minimally flourishing life have a right that the able-bodied make their organs available to them posthumously. In this chapter, the author aims to defend two claims. The first is that if one thinks that the badly off have a moral right, as a matter of justice, to the material resources they need in order to lead a minimally flourishing life, then one must be committed to conferring on the sick a moral right that the able-bodied supply them the body parts they need in order to lead such a life. The second is that one can confer such a right on the sick without compromising the autonomy of the able-bodied to an unacceptable extent. The author considers an unpalatable, and possible, implication of her arguments in favour of the duties to provide personal services and body parts, namely, the coercively directed provision of sexual and reproductive services.
