ABSTRACT

Although we human beings typically think that death can be a bad thing or misfortune for the individual who dies, it is not easy to explain why or how death can be a bad thing, when (and if) it in fact is. The deprivation account of death’s badness has various problems. It must explain how a mere deprivation – an experiential blank in this instance – can be bad for an individual. This chapter focuses on what has called the most puzzling aspect of the family of puzzles pertaining to death: the intuitive asymmetry between prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. One of the arguments presented by Lucretius is the Symmetry Argument. The chapter explores Kaufman’s development of the asymmetry of possibility view. It argues that a version of Nagel’s original response to the symmetry argument can be sustained if we are clear about the account of persons that is relevant to the issue of the badness of death.