ABSTRACT
It has been objected that consequentialism cannot be defined in the traditional way as denying there to be actions that are morally right or wrong ‘whatever (the value of) their consequences’, since then paradigmatic consequentialist theories, like utilitarianism, would fail to be consequentialist. This chapter explores that this objection can be met by restricting this definition to ‘normatively non-inclusive’ actions. By 'consequentialism', it means act-consequentialism, as opposed to rule-consequentialism, motive-consequentialism, etc. it is clear that the distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialism cannot fill the main purpose for which it was introduced, namely, to draw a line between two types of theory that have divergent normative implications. If we are interested in what makes a normative difference, we probably have to descend to a more specific level and ask such questions as whether or not we should accept act-omission doctrine (AOD) and doctrine of the double effect (DDE).
