ABSTRACT
Eighty years have passed since the Vienna Circle's endeavours to divide philosophy into the meaningful and empirical, on one side, and the meaningless, unproductive metaphysics conducted by intuition, on the other. Wittgenstein attacks the idea that the meaning of an expression can be found outside the context of its use and still determine correct use. The Memory-Criteria Argument extends this conclusion to the 'private' domain, a domain in which one would appear to have full control. The Memory-Criteria Argument lays the foundation for the Manometer-Beetle Argument. Millikan and Dennett display the influence of the therapeutic elements in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Dennett, in particular, has espoused a conception of philosophy, when done properly, as therapy against the speculative, phantasmic constructions of the intellect; he regards the philosopher as a curer of diseases rather than someone engaged in the discovery of truth. More than once, Dennett has attempted to demonstrate the futility of working with a substantial conception of meaning and consciousness.
