ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the transition in Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy which happened sometime between 1933 and 1936. It explores Wittgenstein's transition, and its effects on the privacy issue, through a piece of writing which, remarkably in Wittgenstein's case, is quite self-contained. Accordingly, one way to summarize the developments analysed in the chapter is that Wittgenstein's transition marked his progress from a 'privacy-friendly' conception of the nature of language to a 'privacy-hostile' conception. The radical change in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of language that occurred during the 1930s altered his view, not just of privacy, but the nature of philosophy itself. The showdown with privacy was a showdown with the picture theory for Wittgenstein. In other words, the transition in Wittgenstein's philosophy was fundamental and changed his approach to problems. The focal point of Wittgenstein's discussion is clearly the private object – the object which, he argues, can play no essential role in language.
