ABSTRACT
Pakistan’s Latest Predicament1 The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of international attendance. Again, Pakistan seems to be at a crossroads. The decision of President Musharraf to back the United States’ ‘war on terrorism’ amounted to a dramatic turn in Pakistan’s foreign policy, with wideranging domestic repercussions. For years, Islamabad had supported the Taliban politically and militarily. Mutually beneficial to both, close ties and common interests developed between the military establishment, religious scholars and merchant capitalists in Pakistan on one side and the Taliban leadership on the other. These strategic relations provided Pakistan’s leaders much needed ‘strategic depth’ vis-à-vis its arch-rival India, vital political elbowroom to handle internal pressures and economic space to promote business interests. However, confronted with the ‘choice’ to be either America’s friend or foe in the years to come, General Musharraf could no longer afford to turn a blind eye to the international costs. Proclaiming a ‘Pakistan First’ policy, the Head of State and Commander of the Armed Forces had to take decisions that ran counter to the vested interests of
1 The results presented here are part of a research project in state dynamics in the Third World which has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) from 1998 to 2001. To some extent, the following arguments are based on observations which were obtained during two research trips in Pakistan. A draft of this paper was presented at the XVIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Quebec City, 15 August 2000. Among others, the author is indebted to the participants of the panel and to Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha and Dr Peter Lock for valuable comments. The usual caveats apply. The final version of the manuscript was submitted in July 2002. Since then, there has been a new surge in Pakistan-related literature. However, most of the new work focuses on Pakistan’s connection to international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and its potential to become a ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ state. In contrast to the line of argument presented here, these articles tend to look at Pakistan from an international security perspective, limiting domestic issues to the question of ‘stability’ – for which reason they have not been considered here. For a brief account on the question of stability, see Wilke (2004).
