This mild response may not be enough to convince a hard-line Hempelian. The objection, up to now, involved the simple claim that explanation might be considered an exclusively intellectual task. a more robust form of this objection can be envisaged not in terms of the task involved, but in terms of the results sought. when faced with an intriguing phenomenon, what we seek is its explanation, often assumed to be a unique discourse that may be partially or fully determined depending on our ability and technical facilities. Holding that, for any given explanandum, there is a full explanation waiting to be discerned by us is an avowal of strong realism of a somewhat platonic kind. according to this new form of the objection, therefore, no causal links can be assumed to exist between explanation and personal habits simply because explanation is a process of tracing the contours of an intellectual landscape, as it were. There is no room for the idea that a correct explanation can be relative to the one formulating it.