ABSTRACT
Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of rights, both moral and legal. The "Will Theory" and the "Interest Theory"—the two main views—can each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory. The diachronic conception of value pluralism draws on Joseph Raz's theory of values. This chapter examines how the Will Theory and the Interest Theory each capture distinct features of the usage of right in contemporary moral and legal discourse. It argues that the debate between two theories is irresolvable because Will Theory and the Interest Theory reflect the meaning of rights within rival and incommensurable value paradigms existing in today's moral and legal culture. The chapter then argues that the Will Theory represents a fragment of a once integrated normative framework, and that it is in abstraction from such framework that this theory becomes beset by puzzles. The Will Theory was introduced in Anglo-American legal theory by H.L.A. Hart.
