ABSTRACT
Ludwig Wittgenstein is interested in the Tractatus in drawing a contrast between how things are in the world and their significance from the point of view of the higher. Wittgenstein is arguing that what someone who speaks with an ethical intention wants to say is from that point of view simply nonsense. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein ties what he says about ethics and the higher to the idea that it is the whole world that comes into view in these kinds of talk. Gareth Moore inherits an important strand of criticism of naturalism and psychologism both in logic and in ethics, which also has affinities with Wittgenstein. The appeal to the notion of an ineffable content, which lies behind the inexpressibility of ethics and of other areas on which Wittgenstein recommends silence, shows an implicit adherence to the idea that ethical thought follows the same pattern of factual discourse.
