ABSTRACT

This chapter explains what is entailed for politics and philosophy in accepting anti-foundationalism, and looks at the current and focused philosophical debates over anti-foundationalism and the key issue around which debates must hinge, supervenience. It also looks briefly at the arguments of Richard Rorty, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer which though narrowly focused, were the prompt for the wider debate. The chapter deals with the implication of the hypothesis that political science, like all disciplines and knowledge-claiming discourses, has no indubitable or agreed foundations. It argues that, while political theory and practice must change, that there is still a valuable and workable role for a non-foundational philosophy and politics in the future. The hope and horizon of expectation for a pluralistic new politics, expressing the dynamics of new cultures and identities, inhabiting new space and time frameworks, coincides with efforts to establish a new global economic and international order, and intellectual efforts after intellectual cosmopolis.