ABSTRACT

There is no such thing as pure information. In the media-dominated world in which we live, politicians need to present their policies, and the sources upon which they are based, in the best possible light. In recent years those charged with the task of presentation, political special advisers or so-called ‘spin-doctors’, have increased both in terms of numbers and importance. Their purpose is to manipulate information. This chapter explores the role of special advisers. It analyses recent developments in the practices of presentation, and considers how the Freedom of Information Act, with its promise of more open government, might affect the work of special advisers in the future. FoI legislation is unlikely to change the so-called ‘culture of spin’ quickly; but, together with other changes, for example the potential Civil Service Act and the reforms instigated by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the effect might be to make more open the activities specifically of political special advisers in government. Then again, it might not. The chapter is in three parts. Part one provides a short history of the emergence of political special advisers in British central government since the end of the Second World War. Part two considers the changing role of these special advisers since the election of the New Labour Government in 1997, a role that is apparently not just about the presentation of policy but also about its formation. This part contains a short examination of examples of the role played by the present government’s most significant special advisers. Finally, there is a consideration of what might be the effect on the role of special advisers of FoI legislation and other reforms connected with the civil service more widely. The essential theme is that of accountability. Indeed, in his chapter Simon James suggests that one of the potential benefits of the Freedom of Information Act is that it will improve the accountability of government. This chapter is thus not about the advantages and disadvantages of special advisers, it is rather about accepting that they play a significant role in the policy process in the United Kingdom. It raises questions of vital importance in representative democracy about how their work might be made more open and about how they might be made more accountable. The central question is whether the Act, in concert with other changes, will lead to

a more rigorous accountability framework for those who have hitherto remained largely unanswerable for their activities.