ABSTRACT
While simple categorematic terms, whether absolute or connotative, are supposed to be implemented in the mind as a result of an abstraction process rooted in direct encounters with concrete individuals, no such explanation is available for syncategorematic concepts. Ockham saw the problem very early and gave it a first answer in the Ordinatio from the point of view of the fictum-theory of concepts. This chapter argues that logical concepts can only be innate in Ockham's later actus-theory. It discusses the status of some apparently non-logical syncategorematic prepositions and verbs such as 'in', 'of', 'before', 'to have', 'to inhere in', and so on. The actus-theory provides a rather elegant account of logical concepts: they are functional mental acts of a special sort, that normally do not occur alone in the mind, but that can be combined with categorematic conceptual acts to form complex units endowed with precise semantical roles, that of being a quantified subject or predicate term.
