ABSTRACT
The theory of social capital is frequently criticised for its negative aspects given that social networks do not always support economic development and democracy (Portes 1998). The literature of collective action shows how game theory can help to explain such unwanted effects, because ‘in a social dilemma, actors may sometimes find it attractive to utilise social relations for personal ends that are unrelated to or even in conflict with collective goals’ (Flache 1996, p. 3). Another, less explored weak point in the theory of social capital concerns the relationship between social capital and public policies (cf. Montgomery et al. 2001). For instance, research in industrial districts has shown how social capital can be a crucial resource for local development,1 as well as that the collective-action approach does not necessarily benefit everybody. There is no systematic exploration, however, of the role of public policies in social-capital creation,2 although the subject is of major importance today. The crisis of the industrial districts (Cossentino et al. 1996) and the new role of the state in economic growth, require finding out the mechanisms with which public policies can increase local social capital. The most interesting point here is one that has hardly been considered, namely the deliberate promotion of social capital through social
engineering by the state. So, ‘if social capital is a self-organising system with many actors connected in an amorphous web or network, it cannot be controlled with the tool kit of rational utilitarian instrumental planning* (Wilson 1997, p. 748). I disagree, and would argue that the new local-development policies are a possible link between self-organising systems and state regulation.
