ABSTRACT

Sequencing choices can be a prominent feature of coalition building, an implicit logic governs the tactics employed, and these tactics may significantly affect the results. Surprisingly little systematic consideration has been given to the processes by which negotiators build coalitions, the logic behind their tactical choices, and how these actions matter to outcomes. This chapter focuses on sequential processes ranging from exploiting patterns of deference, to progressively worsening no-agreement alternatives, to preventing private knowledge from becoming common knowledge, to shaping outcome expectations, and the like. It analyses common classes of tactical choice such as bootstrapping, pyramiding, and setting bandwagons in motion. The path effects of bootstrapping to get allies on board first would likely bequeath a final negotiation that would be both far more costly and risky than a pyramidal approach. The most powerful advances in negotiation theory have been mainly inspired by the bilateral or two-party case — where issues of sequence inherently cannot arise.