ABSTRACT

The openness of debate about counter-insurgency in Britain contrasts sharply with the secrecy which has hitherto shrouded discussion of British intelligence. According to Thomas Mockaitis, the key to Britain’s success in combating insurgency lay in the careful application of minimum force. The lack of study of the role of British intelligence in counter-insurgency operations is not primarily because its operations are inevitably covert, while those of the army and police are far more open. Mockaitis and the authors in Anderson and Killingray’s volume agree that insurgency invariably gained ground as a result of bad police intelligence. The main reason for the development of British foreign intelligence in North America and in Japan was the existence of the Indian revolutionary movement. The post-war period was undoubtedly one of growth in the development of British counter-intelligence. By the end of the 1940s, the British felt the need to combat Communist subversion centred on Moscow with a unified counter-intelligence effort of their own.