ABSTRACT
In the light with the Basmachi and Caucasian rebels, the Soviets have gained rich experience in dealing with Muslim guerrilla insurgencies. From their past confrontations with Muslim guerrilla movements, the Soviets should have learned five fundamental lessons, and they should have sought to implement these pieces of historical wisdom in their dealings with Afghans. The lessons are: divide the adversary; win over crucial native groups; create a strong indigenous Communist Party apparatus; field a Muslim national army; and create an Afghan national Communism. These five factors can be sharpened by three additional conditions whose successful creation would seem to bear on the Soviet prospects for success in Afghanistan. First, Soviet leaders must create as rapidly as possible a disciplined, unified, and dedicated Communist Party apparatus whose members can function as effective political cadre. Second, Afghan Communist leaders must develop an acceptable theory of Afghan national Communism. Third, a competent and reliable Afghan army must be returned to the field.
