ABSTRACT
A common characteristic of British counter-insurgency practice–at least in the early stages of a campaign–is confusion of aims, of command, of organisation and of intelligence. Counter-insurgency operations almost always contain elements of both ‘police’ and ‘military’ methods. This chapter examines two major aspects of intelligence: the co-ordination of the whole intelligence operation and the various modes of collection and discusses implementation of intelligence in counter-insurgency operations. A particular dilemma of intelligence co-ordination which is almost impossible to solve is the basic incompatibility of the police intelligence function with the military. The successful implementation of intelligence, striking the correct balance between background, operational and criminal information, depends on the establishment of a well co-ordinated and centralised intelligence machine. There are three main modes of intelligence collection in counterinsurgency operations: overt, confidential and clandestine. Military security intelligence, which had been effective from the return of the British to Malaya, was wound up at the end of 1947.
