ABSTRACT
A decade ago Benjamin Isaac raised the question of whether there was such a thing as a ‘Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire’, in the sense of a consistent policy towards the East formulated by the high command in the light of such rational considerations as deterrence, the security of the inhabitants of the provinces and supposedly ‘natural’ frontiers. Isaac cast doubt on the idea that the Romans had primarily defensive aims, such as withstanding incursions from the Persians or the Saracens.1 Instead, he suggested, a variety of considerations, changing over time, led Roman emperors to intervene in the Caucasus and Mesopotamia and then to maintain a presence there. Among these was the need to consolidate their hold over existing provinces; the need to fund the occupation by means of occasional forays in quest of plunder from enemy territory; and, not least, the yearning for ‘glory’ which Roman historians themselves quite often ascribe to emperors. For example, Dio Cassius writes of Trajan that ‘he campaigned against the Armenians and Parthians on the pretext that the Armenian king had received his diadem not at his hands but from the Parthian king; but the real reason was a desire for fame’, in the footsteps of Alexander.2 Isaac concluded that ‘Roman expansion may have been far less systematic than is often claimed. It was an aim in itself and therefore opportunistic’.3
