ABSTRACT
Liberal neutrality has been criticized from many angles. This chapter concerns the connection critics draw between neutrality and individualism, particularly in the context of Rawls's theory of justice. It distinguishes three different ways that critics have attempted to connect neutrality and individualism and argues that all rest on misinterpretations of Rawls's theory. The chapter shows that the dispute over liberal neutrality would be more fruitful if both sides moved away from general questions of "individualism" toward more specific questions about the relationship between state, society, and culture in liberal democracies. Consequential neutrality is also inconsistent with Rawls's explanation of the role of "primary goods". The chapter considers some versions of the claim that liberal neutrality, as envisioned by Rawls, is excessively individualistic. Liberal neutrality does not restrict the scope of perfectionist ideals in the collective activities of individuals and groups. Individual judgments about the good always depend on, and flow from, the collective evaluation of shared practices.
