ABSTRACT
If the Critique of Judgement, to the extent that it is concerned with the reflective judgement of taste, contributes nothing to knowledge, as Kant repeatedly affirms, then nor does it, in spite of the almost overwhelming magnetic attraction of morality for him, offer an ethical pedagogy that could 'guide' the teacher in any comprehensible way. Aesthetic judgement is necessary to produce a work, but, once produced, reflective judgement, now bound-up with the process of reception, falls away from the work in its infinite entanglement with the judgements of others and the fruitless quest for universal communication. In reality, the proximal reception of the work has an impact on the reflective engagement with the judgement. Interestingly, and importantly, the student's relation to the work is far more complex than is the teacher's, whose authority depends upon a certain ignorance of both the production and the reception.
