ABSTRACT
The identification of the Quinean conceptual schemes with languages prompts us to consider cross-language translation. As W. V. Quine realized, it is 'a measure of what might be called the remoteness of a conceptual scheme but what might better be called the conceptual distance between languages'. D. Davidson's arguments from inverifiability against the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes are fully loaded with many unwarranted assumptions, theories, principles, or notions, the translatability criterion of alternative conceptual schemes, the principle of charity, and the so-called fitting model of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes are about concepts. However, the notion of concept is notoriously murky and slippery, referring to a shadowy and problematic entity of some obscure sort, such as Platonic mind-independent abstract entity, disposition, mental ability to perform certain activities, or whatever composes the propositional content of one's thought or belief. The translatability criterion of conceptual schemes, both as a criterion of languagehood and as a criterion of alternative conceptual schemes, is incoherent.
