ABSTRACT
The author in this chapter compares Kant’s (diverging) formulations of the distinction between morality and legality within the Metaphysics of Morals as well as in the Critique of Pure Reason and he tries to explicate two different senses in which “the idea of duty” is the incentive “ethical lawgiving” connects with its laws. The author then, turns to the question of what the corresponding incentive in “juridical lawgiving” consists in and how it is related to the concept of right as defined in the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Right”. The author distinguishes two interpretations of what Kant means by “acting from duty” according to what the truth of the counterfactual is supposed to depend on. He focuses on the relation between right and morality, by asking what corresponds in juridical lawgiving to the idea of duty in ethical lawgiving and what role this specifically juridical incentive plays in Kant’s concept of right.
