ABSTRACT

In the previous chapter some general lines of a discursive approach to rights were sketched out. This was foremost done by going through different deliberative standpoints and analyzing what deliberative elements would be fertile to promote in relation to the philosophical basis when dealing specifically with human rights. For example, differences between epistemic and fair proceduralism were elucidated and Habermas’ vague definition of procedure was rejected in favour of a weak epistemic proceduralism. Moreover, it was argued that it is more appropriate to follow Richardson and focus on partially joint intentions than individual preferences when preoccupied with global deliberation over rights. This was also claimed to be more useful for loosening up Habermas’ rigid distinction between consensus and compromise in order to open up for compromises as a probable and acceptable outcome of a global rights discourse. As soon as we rely on the proposed universal pragmatics, rather than on Habermas’ validity claims, we do not have to draw the conclusion that a compromise is an outcome of strategic action whereas consensus is an outcome of communicative action. Instead, we might reach a valid compromise and still follow the universal pragmatic action rules. Furthermore, I developed an alternative notion of consensus, comprising a performative attitude of an epistemic and normative kind, detached from time and thus disconnected from any idea of (potential) outcomes. I also argued that a discourse theory of human rights must put conflict solving and stability before any ideas of autonomy or the common will. Finally, a two-sided U-principle was elaborated on, which followed Gunther’s reading of Habermas but was connected to the action rules of language in relation to discourses of application and to Strzelewicz’s logical defence of human rights in relation to discourses of justification.