ABSTRACT
Particularly since the Seattle Ministerial and in the run-up to Doha, unprecedented attention has been devoted to the processes of operation of the WTO. Debates have raged over the subjects of internal and external transparency of WTO processes, the accountability and legitimacy of the institution, and possibilities of institutional reform. This paper addresses one key question that underlies many of the debates and provides the first and crucial hinge on which all other issues of institutional democracy, accountability, legitimacy, and the very functioning of the WTO depend. It asks to what extent have the decisionmaking processes of the WTO affected (facilitated, impeded, or been neutral to) the participation of the majority of its members, namely developing countries? It also analyses and assesses some of the proposals for institutional reform. Many of these proposals may deal with intricate details of decision making but they have far-reaching implications on the character of the WTO and global economic governance. Given the dangers that some of these implications entail, the paper puts forth the case for cautious reform rather than radical restructuring of the WTO and suggests ways in which other international bodies could facilitate the more effective participation of developing countries.
